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While the regional economic integration encompassing the former Soviet Union (FSU) tran-
spires to be inefficient, there appears to be a stronger interest in regionalism in smaller groups 
of more homogenous and geographically connected countries of the region, specifically, Cen-
tral Asia. Using a new dataset, we find that although the economic links between the Central 
Asian countries are more pronounced than between that of the CIS in several key areas, this 
advantage has been disappearing fast over the last decade. In addition, the trend of economic 
integration of Central Asia strongly correlates to that of the CIS in general. Currently Central 
Asia should be treated as a sub-region of the post-Soviet world rather than a definite integra-
tion region.On the other hand, however, we find that Kazakhstan emerges as a new centre for 
regional integration, which can bear some potential for regionalism in Central Asia, and that 
there is an increasing trend towards greater economic interconnections with China in Central 
Asia. 
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1  Introduction 
The last two decades of independence of the former Soviet Union (FSU) republics clearly 
demonstrated what was probably hidden beyond the centralised Soviet hierarchy – an ex-
tremely high heterogeneity of the new independent states: both in terms of political and eco-
nomic formal and informal institutions and also results of economic reforms and economic 
performance. It certainly contributed to the emergence of sub-regionalism as a new regional 
integration approach, focusing particularly on the interaction of subgroups of (supposedly) 
more homogenous FSU states (see DWAN and PAVLIUK, 2000, for an encompassing survey 
of this process). The concept of “sub-regionalism” has been suggested by BREMMER and 
BAILES (1998: 132) to describe “formally constituted intergovernmental groupings which 
cover a geographically coherent area smaller than any of Europe’s ‘region-wide’ organisa-
tions”. In the context of this study “Europe” in this definition should be replaced by “the 
FSU”. Hence, instead of the encompassing solution for all or potentially all (or almost all, 
with the exception of Baltic states) FSU countries “sub-regionalism” suggests concentrating 
the cooperation effort in smaller geographical areas.  
Obvious examples of this potential sub-regional cooperation are the triad of Eastern European 
countries — Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and the five Central Asian states. And, whereas the 
need for greater cooperation and integration of Eastern European states is being seriously 
questioned, e.g. in the light of the alternative EU path to integration, many researchers from 
the post-Soviet countries and the West alike believe that further economic cooperation of 
Central Asian states is at least generally speaking warranted (see e.g. GREEN, 2001; BART-
LETT, 2001; GLEASON, 2001; GEYKDAGI, 2005). SPECHLER (2000) refers to the ab-
sence of regional cooperation in Central Asia as to a “pathology”. It is interesting though that 
the assessment of the economic cooperation of the whole set of the FSU states (e.g. within the 
CIS) is in many cases more skeptical. MICHAILOPULOS and TARR (1997) provide a sys-
tematic overview of potential economic costs of the regional cooperation within the CIS, and 
BABETSKII et al. (2003) relate the persistence of economic ties between the CIS countries to 
the weakness of their institutions. These discrepancies in the literature refer mostly to the 
normative analysis of the welfare effects of Central Asian regionalism; on the positive side  
the success of the formal cooperation initiatives in Central Asia has been so far negligible, in 
spite  of  a  proliferation  of  regional  bilateral  and  multilateral  agreements  (AKINER  2007, 
POMFRET,  2002;  2009).  The  literature  points out  multiple  possible  reasons  for  the  non-
cooperation result: the non-democratic nature of political regimes in the region’s countries, 
numerous territorial disputes, and economic protectionism implemented by some of the coun-
tries (SPECHLER 2002). 
An interesting perspective on the Central Asian regionalism could be derived from looking at 
the “natural” area for regional cooperation. KRUGMAN (1991) in his analysis of the free 
trade areas distinguishes between “natural” and “unnatural” trade blocs: while the former are 
composed of geographically proximate countries, which already exhibit significant trade links 
(and can contribute to these countries’ welfare), “unnatural” blocs include remote countries 
with absent trade links (and produce no benefits in terms of welfare of the member countries).  Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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In some sense, “natural” blocs build upon the already existing economic linkages between 
countries, which emerged without the direct intervention of the governments through sponta-
neous interaction of economic agents: cross-border investments, trade and migration. This 
process is often referred to in the literature as “regionalisation”, as opposed to more formal 
“regionalism” (LORENZ 1992).  
One can point out yet another advantage of the “natural” trade blocs: their political feasibility. 
First, if one looks at the regional integration as a public good, it makes sense to produce it at 
the level of governance at which it can be “internalised” completely, which is probably de-
termined by the extent of regionalisation in a particular geographical space. Second, region-
alisation supports social ties, and hence leads to greater homogeneity of preferences. In addi-
tion, it can simply be indicative of greater homogeneity, suggesting that the transaction costs 
of trade in this area are smaller. Third, it can also generate stronger demand for economic 
cooperation from the private sector (MATTLI, 1999; HERRMANN-PILLATH, 2006). Al-
though there is no  guarantee of positive  effects, regionalisation does at least increase the 
chances of regionalism.
1 
While in some cases it is easy to distinguish the “natural” and the “unnatural” integration ar-
eas,  in  other  parts of  the  world,  where  the natural  borders  between regions are  less  pro-
nounced, it is a non-trivial task. This seems to be true for Central Asia without clear “natural” 
borders separating it from, for example, China and Russia. Therefore a reasonable approach to 
“chart” the “natural” regions for economic cooperation in Eurasia is to look at the develop-
ment of regionalisation. This exercise is also interesting from yet another perspective: region-
alisation may matter for other concepts of “region-ness”, which are discussed in social sci-
ences and have been applied to the Central Asian case, and itself depends on these various 
processes. Therefore providing empirical evidence for the scope of regionalisation could be 
relevant for a more elaborate understanding of other aspects of region-building in Central 
Asia and the FSU.
2  
                                                 
1 There have been several cases when regionalisation has been outperforming the formal intergovernmental co-
operation in economic area. For example, in Southeast Asia the  interdependence between economies has been 
driven by the activities of Chinese business networks and Japanese multinationals (PENG 2000). An even 
more relevant case is that of Africa, where very weak intergovernmental cooperation co-exists with extremely 
developed informal trade ties (LITTLE 2005). While in some cases regionalisation has been supported by hi-
erarchical power relations between countries (the case of US multinationals in Mexico, see CASANOVA 
2004), in other regions it moved forward under the general conditions of hostility (South Asia, see TANEJA 
2005) or even ignored the intergovernmental relations (once again, Africa). 
2 A caveat applies here: the exact definition of what constitutes a “natural” trading block and how it should be 
measured has been subject to intensive debate (see KREININ and PLUMMER 1994). It is especially the case 
because regionalisation is in some sense endogenous to regionalism (e.g. can be caused by the past or present 
political ties) – in our context, of the Soviet past. Our focus is rather to compare the FSU and the Central Asia 
to each other (from both static and dynamic perspective) than to an external benchmark.  Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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The analysis of this paper expands the literature by applying a new dataset of the System of 
Indicators  of Eurasian  Integration  (SIEI)  from  the  Eurasian  Development  Bank  (EDB)  in 
2009 (see VINOKUROV, 2010), which provides time series of indicators measuring various 
aspects of economic interdependence in Central Asia for the period of 1999-2008. We will 
use these data (in their original form, as well as adjusted, e.g. to control for informal trade) to 
compare the development of regional economic ties between Central Asian countries and in 
the FSU region in general. Our main question is whether regionalisation in Central Asia has 
been more successful than in the rest of the FSU, and therefore whether there are any reasons 
to treat Central Asia as a region closer to a “natural” integration area than the CIS in general. 
In addition, we intend to look at two more specific options, which could make regionalism in 
Central Asia more feasible than in the FSU in general. First, Central Asia is “different” in 
terms of the influence of an extra-regional actor, potentially able to have an impact on re-
gional cooperation: so, we examine the role of economic connections outside the post-Soviet 
space – for example, China – and their ability to re-shape the economic development in the 
region. Second, Central Asia exhibits a different power structure than the FSU in general, 
which could be more beneficial for the regional cooperation. A probable candidate is Kazakh-
stan, which we will discuss in greater detail.  
The paper is organised as follows: the next section provides a theoretical framework for our 
analysis, placing this paper in the existing academic context of research on regionalism in 
post-Soviet affairs. The third section presents the dataset. The fourth section briefly summa-
rises the main findings with respect to three  empirical questions of this paper: the existence 
of close economic ties in Central Asia, the role of China and the rise of Kazakhstan. The fifth 
section amends the analysis by taking informal trade in Central Asia into account. The final 
section concludes. 
 
2  “Region-ness” of Central Asia in the studies of the post-Soviet affairs 
The theoretical literature on regionalism offers multiple frameworks as to how a region can be 
identified  (HURRELL  1995;  HETTNE  and  SOEDERBAUM  2000),  and  these  different 
perspectives have been used to determine the extent of “region-ness” in Central Asia and the 
FSU.  Generally  speaking,  Central  Asia  is  still  perceived  as  an  “emerging  region” 
(KAZANTSEV,  2008)  with  multiple  competing  concepts  of  its  institutionalisation  and 
structure. Even more, as QORABOYEV (2010) argues, the concept of Central Asia is, in a 
sense, “invented” by the actors and the observers. If one attempts to evaluate the potential of 
Central  Asia’s  states  to  develop  a  coherent  regional  cooperation  model,  one  would  be 
interested in clearly defined criteria of the “distinctiveness” of the region (for instance, from 
the FSU), which would vary depending upon the theoretical perspective of the observers.  Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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For the purpose of this paper, two lines of research seem to be of significant importance, since 
the concepts of regions applied by these studies are both highly relevant for the scope of 
regionalisation  and  may  be  influenced  by  the  regionalisation  itself: the  “regional  security 
complex” approach and the “homogeneity of politics, economies and cultures” approach. 
The regional security complex (RSC) theory defines a region as a “set of units whose major 
processes  of  securitisation,  de-securitisation,  or  both  are  so  interlinked  that  their  security 
problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (BUZAN and 
WAEVER 2003: 44). RSC may be influenced and “penetrated” by external powers, whose 
presence is an important element of the regional security dynamics, but which, nevertheless, 
are not considered to be part of the RSC. HETTNE and SOEDERBAUM (2000) show  that a 
similar  “regional  complex”  perspective  can  be  extended  to  the  political  economy  of 
development. BUZAN and WAEVER (2003) interpret the post-Soviet space as a Russian-
centred RSC. Central Asia is described  as  a potential RSC if the countries of the  region 
become a sufficiently threat to each other or when the extent of their cooperation becomes of 
sufficient scale. Although Russia during the 1990s did subsequently lose its role as the unique 
“security manager” in Central Asia (see JONSON 2001; ALLISON 2004) and in the FSU in 
general (TRENIN 2002; NIKITIN 2007), the interdependence of the post-Soviet states with 
Russia is so high that their security issues cannot be reasonably treated as separate problems. 
MILLER (2006) points out the impact of this interdependence on the choices of Central Asian 
countries in the area of cooperation. 
Another feature of the internal transformation of this RSC is particularly important for this 
paper: as NYGREN (2008) demonstrates, during the last decade Russia’s attention to the FSU 
increased  significantly,  which  was  consistent  with  the  geo-political  objective  set  for  the 
country by the post-Yeltsin leadership. He also points out that Russia’s influence in the FSU 
is combining the “traditional” political and security tools with the new economic tools of “soft 
power” (see also TSYGANKOV 2006 and KANET 2008), specifically in the energy area 
(NYGREN 2008a). This approach can be used to provide two insights to the debate on the 
“natural”  regions  for  economic  cooperation.  First,  since  security  dynamics  influences  the 
patterns of the economic linkages between countries, one could expect the maintained role of 
Russia and its ambitions to strengthen the economic ties within the FSU and keep Central 
Asia part of this larger complex. An even more important point is, second, the reliance on the 
soft power tools, which inherently consider the structure of economic linkages as one of the 
key  power  resources  the  dominant  power  in  the  region  would  aspire  to  use.  Hence, 
regionalisation  at  the  FSU  level  is  likely  to  support  the  persistence  of  an  RSC  by 
strengthening  the  security  interdependence  of  the  FSU  countries  (originating  from  their 
intense economic ties), but also can be influenced by the dynamics of the RSC, if economic 
tools are used in the power contest. Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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It raises a very interesting question about the relation between the power dynamics in the RSC 
and  the  economic  links.  On  the  one  hand,  COLLINS  (2009)  reports that  in  Central  Asia 
security  cooperation  between  states  has  been  (somewhat)  more  successful  than  economic 
cooperation  (in  this  case  one  compares  the  “poor”  and  the  “very  poor”  outcomes,  to  be 
precise),  explaining  it  by  the  demand  of  non-democratic  regimes  for  mutual  support, 
protection and legitimisation, and willingness to take control over the domestic economy. 
Similar issues are likely to affect relations with Russia, which also often serve to protect the 
local autocracies (TOLSTRUP 2009). A recent case of the Russian multinational UC RUSAL 
in Tajikistan, one of the supposedly closest allies of Russia in the FSU, illustrates the problem 
at hand: after receiving substantial support from Russia in strengthening its regime, the Tajik 
leadership  did  not  hesitate  to  take  an  attractive  contract  away  from  RUSAL  in  spite  of 
Russia’s protests.  
On the other hand, while in many cases Russian investments and trade seem to follow the 
political dominance logic (see NYGREN 2008: 238-245), it is questionable whether political 
motivation has determined the majority of the economic links across the FSU states that have 
been  established  in  the  2000s  by  private  enterprises:  VAHTRA  (2007),  for  example, 
concludes  that  Russian  multinationals  often  use  the  “standard”  economic  rational  when 
allocating their investments. From this point of view an increase in regionalisation does not 
necessarily follow from the Russian government’s effort to secure its dominant position in the 
FSU (although this does not exclude the ability of political leadership to exploit it). And, 
while the intentions of the Russian policy in Central Asia are clear, the literature raises serious 
doubts whether Russia indeed managed to implement its goals in the region (SPECHLER and 
SPECHLER 2010). 
In addition, as mentioned, external powers (specifically, China) are likely to have a serious 
impact  on  Central  Asia  as  part  of  the  Russian-centred  RSC.  KAVALSKI  (2010)  in  this 
context refers even to the “hegemonial fragmentation” of Central Asia, which indicates the 
multiplicity of external powers engaging in the contest for the region. Whether the metaphor 
of the “New Great Game” is indeed applicable for Central Asia, is questionable (BUZAN and 
WAEVER  2003),  but  for  us  it  is  important  to  note  that  “economic”  tools  of  soft  power 
constitute an important part of the strategies of other external parties in the region. Here two 
question emerges, which have not been answered in the literature. First, there is a purely 
empirical debate. The literature exploring the economic cooperation between China and the 
Central Asian states has been significant (WU, CHEN, 2004; PEYROUSE, 2007; LEVINS-
SON, SVANBERG, 2000; SWANSTROEM 2003), and mostly points out the rise of eco-
nomic linkages. However, the results are not entirely conclusive: some authors (LI, WANG, 
1999) call for a more cautious interpretation of the extent of economic interdependence. Sec-
ond, however, economic tools used by different external powers may be different – for exam-
ple, for China informal trade networks can play an important role (RABALLAND and AN-
DRESY, 2007), and therefore their impact on the degree of regionalisation is not clear ex 
ante. Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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The  second  perspective  on  region-building  in  the  FSU  looks  at  the  extent  of  economic, 
political and cultural similarity of the countries. This is, once again, an issue closely related 
to regionalisation. On the one hand, trade and  investment between homogenous countries 
(from the point of view of their culture and institutions) are likely to be associated with lower 
transaction costs, which therefore make the intensification of economic ties more likely. It 
also applies to the cross-country cooperation in economic area, as FENG and GENNA (2003) 
show. On the other hand, common cultural and institutional features can be “transmitted” 
along  the  lines  of  trade  and  migration  –  for  example,  due  to  the  promotion  of  common 
language  and  common  business  practices.  However,  unlike  the  RSC  analysis,  where  the 
overall conclusion seems to stress the persistence of the Russia-centered regional complex, 
particularly  in the  2000s,  the  analyses  of  the  homogeneity  are  much  more  skeptical  with 
respect to the “region-ness” of the FSU. GLEASON (2010) claims that the very notion of the 
post-Soviet space is obsolete: different countries have rapidly returned to their cultural and 
political roots. From this perspective, however, the likelihood of region-building in Central 
Asia seems to be more promising, given the long-term historical interdependence of these 
countries (GLEASON 1997). The findings are not entirely conclusive: the key question turns 
out to be the relative importance of the legacies of the Soviet/Russian rule and the pre-Russian 
period, and the former  should not be under-estimated (JONES  LUONG 2002), thus once 
again proving the need for further research. 
Finally, the links between Central Asian states and Russia could remain more intensive than 
between the states of Central Asia as remnants of the Soviet economic organisation. However, 
on the other hand, disorganisation literature (BLANCHARD and KREMER 1997) would pre-
dict that the relatively more advanced production chains (linking Central Asia with Russia) 
should have ceased to exist at an early stage of the collapse of the USSR. Hence, deindustri-
alisation and emergence of the Central Asian new entrepreneurial class (OZCAN 2010) could 
have supported stronger links between geographically close states of Central Asia, leading to 
the regionalisation in this area. 
Somewhat simplified, the predictions regarding the extent of regionalisation in Central are not 
entirely clear: while the RSC perspective would probably point out the economic ties with 
Russia,  the  cultural,  political  and  economic  homogeneity  rather  suggests  that  economic 
linkages ought to develop within Central Asia and separate it from culturally distinct Russia. 
Both  approaches  contain  caveats,  which  make  the  predictions  for  the  regionalisation  less 
unambiguous. On the other hand, these patterns of the regionalisation may very well influence 
both  the  security  dynamics  and  the  institutional  convergence.  They  also  imply  different 
conclusions  for  the  design  of  regional  cooperation  between  states:  BOONSTRA  and 
EMERSON (2010) talk about “introverted” (i.e. including just the Central Asian nations) and 
“extraverted” (i.e. including a larger array of states in Eurasia) regionalism. The difference 
between these two formats is not whether they emerge through the initiative of the states of 
the region or are “bestowed” upon them by external forces, but rather who participates in the 
regional cooperation. However, if the regionalisation is going on within the FSU and not the 
Central Asian region, the “introverted” solution will be not viable if chosen by the states 
themselves and unable to promote economic growth if enforced by external agents.  Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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From this point of view, this paper intends to contribute by providing a systematic empirical 
and quantitative evidence regarding the relative extent of regionalisation in the FSU and in 
the Central Asia (as well as on the linkages between Central Asia and other parts of the 
world). While several other papers have looked at the dynamics of trade in Central Asia (see 
e.g.  POMFRET  2005;  LUECKE  and  ROTHERT  2006;  MYANT  and  DRAHOKOUPIL 
2008), our contribution is to explicitly compare regionalisation in Central Asia and the CIS. 
We do it by using a much more detailed and recent dataset, which covers a significant variety 
of additional aspects of regionalisation, which will be described in what follows.  
 
3  Dataset 
While the “ideal” approach to estimating the degree of regionalisation and integration of mar-
kets would imply the comparison of the price dynamics from the perspective of the Law of 
One Price assumption (O’ROURKE and WILLIAMSON 2002), this is not feasible for Cen-
tral Asia and the FSU. Although some papers report information on the cross-border price 
differentials (GRAFE et al., 2007; KAMINSKI and MITRA 2010), coverage is rarely system-
atic. The situation is not unique for the FSU, and therefore we concentrate on the “second 
best” approach, which is to measure the relative size of the trade and factor flows within the 
region. This is also the approach used by the SIEI. 
The SIEI summarises the information for ten years (1999-2008) and therefore excludes the 
first decade of disintegration in the FSU region following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Once again, we are looking at the “best possible” scenario, disregarding the unavoidable ini-
tial “disintegration push” after the dissolution of the common state and the deep economic 
crisis of the 1990s, which also almost certainly resulted in a contraction of international eco-
nomic ties. The System includes five main indicators describing economic linkages between 
countries. Two of them refer to the “aggregate” linkages in trade in goods and services and in 
labour  migration.  The  remaining  three  indicators  look  at  the  integration  in  three  specific 
“functional” areas: agriculture (grain trade), education and energy (power utilities). The sepa-
rate discussion of these areas allows us not to underestimate the interdependence in the key 
areas shaping the economic development of the countries even if the “overall” integration is 
low.  
The choice of these three areas, apart from the availability of trustworthy data,
3 is motivated 
by the following concerns. The trade in electric power derives its significance from the com-
mon Soviet past, as the post-Soviet states inherited the most integrated power sector in the 
                                                 
3 Electricity and grain trade are also outside the realm of the trade in “bazaar goods”, which is the key element of 
the informal trade linkages in Central Asia and therefore hard to assess quantitatively. Unlike the labor migra-
tion, the statistical records on migration of students are of very high quality, since they are based on  information 
provided by the universities heavily regulated in all Central Asian countries. Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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world – technologically, socially, and in terms of hard infrastructure. In addition to this, the 
current functioning of the power sector is governed by relatively strong international institu-
tions (compared to other sectors) built on close social and educational commonalities (LIB-
MAN and VINOKUROV 2010). While electric power is perhaps the most prominent ‘integra-
tion’ sector deriving its prominence from the past, agriculture (and specifically grain produc-
tion) is a key area which might shape future economic development, particularly in Russia 
and Kazakhstan. The Soviet Union, and later the post-Soviet republics, were the world largest 
grain importers until as late as the 1990s. Due to a true agricultural ‘revolution’, driven purely 
by market forces and comparative advantages, by the end of the 2000s Russia, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine had become among the world’s largest grain exporters with a global market share 
by exports of up to 25%.
4 Finally, education is an important “non-economic” area of coopera-
tion in Central Asia and the CIS, since, first, academic mobility generates a number of far-
reaching consequences, ranging from economic ties between enterprises to close social and 
familial ties to the adoption of common technological standards, and, second, educational 
exchanges in the post-Soviet area benefit significantly from sharing the Russian language as 
the primary means of intercultural and international communication.  
These five indicators are calculated on three levels: ties between country pairs; the level of 
integration of the region in general; and the integration of individual countries into the re-
gion’s economic exchange structure (asymmetric integration). The summary of the calculation 
approach for the indicators is provided in Appendix C. A special advantage of the SIEI data, 
which makes it particularly suitable for this study, is that the indicators are calculated for 
three regions. One of them (defined as CIS-12) includes all FSU countries with the exception 
of Baltic states, which are now members of the EU (and, to be more precise, also includes 
Georgia and Turkmenistan, which are actually not members of the CIS). Hence, it reflects the 
overall integration patterns in the post-Soviet area. The second region (EurAsEC-5) refers to 
the group of countries, which are currently members of the Eurasian Economic Community 
(Russia,  Belarus,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan  and  Tajikistan),  a  Russian-led  group  which  at-
tempts to go beyond the objective achievable in the CIS framework. The main focus of this 
paper is to look at the third region, Central Asia (denoted as CA-4), which includes Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.  
Hence, one can see that of the five post-Soviet Central Asian countries CA-4 covers four, i.e. 
it excludes Turkmenistan. Given Turkmenistan’s closed economic system with strong gov-
ernmental control and severe restrictions on external economic activity, as well as its extreme 
scepticism  towards  any  form  of  multilateral  or  bilateral  cooperation  on  the  governmental 
level, the exclusion of this country, once again, provides the “best possible” picture of the 
Central Asian region, excluding the “most problematic” country (which would probably cause 
poorer characteristics of the regionalisation process in Central Asia to be inferred).  
                                                 
4 Any future efforts to increase export seem to face the need to jointly address bottlenecks in agricultural, rail-
way, and port infrastructure. These problems require concerted regulatory and investments efforts by Ukraine, 
Russia and Kazakhstan aimed at developing infrastructure for the export of grain to the target markets. The 
argumentation along these lines led these three countries to start high-level discussions on the creation of the 
Grain Pool. Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
12 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 155 
 
The composition of the index is also partly due to data availability, since there is very little 
coherent statistical information on Turkmenistan at present. In what follows we will use the 
terms CA-4 and Central Asia as synonyms, referring to the group of four (relatively) more 
open countries. 
It is worth noticing that the SIEI is incomplete at least from two points of view. First, it does 
not include any information on the cross-border investment flows: in fact, measuring cross-
border investments in Central Asia remains a particularly difficult task given the very poor 
quality of statistical data. Second, SIEI concentrates on interpreting official statistics, which 
may have been manipulated for political reasons and, what is more important, disregards in-
formal economic ties. We will discuss this problem, which will become important at least for 
one of the three main research questions of this paper, in what follows. However, in spite of 
its limitations, SIEI as a source of consistent and systematic information on cross-border link-
ages in the FSU region still provides a good set of proxies for measuring the regionalisation 
patterns in Central Asia. 
 
4  Findings 
Table 1 summarises the main results of the empirical evidence obtained from the SIEI, report-
ing the time series of the major indicators relevant for our analysis.
5  
                                                 
5 Appendix B contains the matrix of the dyadic integration indicators for the year 2008 (the last year of the sam-
ple). Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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Table 1: Regional integration in the FSU, SIEI data 
Indicator  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  Соrrelation CIS-12-CA-4  Correlation EurAsEC-5-CA-4 
Trade                          
Kyrgyzstan - CA-4 (asymmetric)  0.102  0.083  0.110  0.126  0.159  0.171  0.166  0.157  0.153  0.115  0.360    
Kyrgyzstan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)  0.387  0.424  0.365  0.382  0.395  0.452  0.477  0.514  0.574  0.551      
Tajikistan - CA-4 (asymmetric)  0.064  0.073  0.072  0.055  0.073  0.082  0.089  0.079  0.094  0.066  -0.386    
Tajikistan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)  0.689  0.822  0.627  0.555  0.457  0.446  0.458  0.435  0.460  0.422      
Kazakhstan - CA-4 (asymmetric)  0.014  0.010  0.011  0.011  0.012  0.012  0.010  0.008  0.009  0.007  0.349    
Kazakhstan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)  0.256  0.321  0.332  0.267  0.274  0.274  0.242  0.237  0.248  0.239      
CA-4 (region-level)  0.059  0.045  0.042  0.038  0.037  0.037  0.031  0.028  0.035  0.030  0.794***    
EurAsEC-5 (region-level)  0.126  0.135  0.127  0.116  0.119  0.124  0.096  0.095  0.098  0.094    0.759** 
CIS-12 (region-level)  0.214  0.224  0.214  0.195  0.201  0.202  0.174  0.169  0.172  0.164      
Labor migration                          
Kyrgyzstan - CA-4 (asymmetric)    0.005  0.007  0.004  0.006  0.421  0.389  0.774  0.420  0.355  0.379    
Kyrgyzstan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)    0.190  0.362  1.305  0.974  2.002  3.562  7.170  21.446  35.564      
Tajikistan - CA-4 (asymmetric)    0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.023  0.030  0.978***    
Tajikistan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)    1.017  1.606  2.641  2.095  3.508  7.761  14.271  35.452  54.995      
Kazakhstan - CA-4 (asymmetric)                          
Kazakhstan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)    0.258  0.314  0.631  0.368  0.905  0.553  0.754  0.857  1.087      
Uzbekistan - CA-4    0.003  0.002  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.022  0.022  0.033  0.029  0.778**    
Uzbekistan - CIS-12    0.284  0.432  0.634  0.589  0.948  1.899  3.979  12.829  23.703      
CA-4 (region-level)    0.002  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.043  0.048  0.085  0.059  0.052  0.560    
EurAsEC-5 (region-level)    0.058  0.089  0.265  0.129  0.214  0.424  0.792  2.069  3.291    0.535 
CIS-12 (region-level)    0.397  0.549  0.754  0.667  0.822  1.267  1.977  4.189  6.452      
Energy                          
Kyrgyzstan - CA-4 (asymmetric)        875.010  979.533  1189.939  1114.603  900.512  656.285  142.305  0.924***    
Kyrgyzstan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)        875.010  1351.113  2003.604  1495.053  900.512  656.285  142.305      
Tajikistan - CA-4 (asymmetric)        6593.803  5900.362  4448.460  3778.093  3209.306  2282.524  1600.365  0.997***    
Tajikistan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)        7070.246  6022.589  4448.460  3778.093  3209.306  2321.261  1836.186      
Kazakhstan - CA-4 (asymmetric)        22.282  51.717  52.135  45.095  26.258  12.283  4.545  0.678*    
Kazakhstan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)        262.231  248.129  228.275  131.539  96.132  66.548  39.281      
Uzbekistan - CA-4        1004.117  877.406  725.490  593.958  505.165  411.501  300.842  1.000***    
Uzbekistan - CIS-12        1004.117  877.406  725.490  593.958  505.165  411.501  300.842      
CA-4 (region-level)        256.884  241.218  192.541  147.679  107.548  78.924  51.655  0.9996***    
EurAsEC-5 (region-level)        26.873  25.806  20.448  15.620  9.537  6.864  4.018    0.998*** 
CIS-12 (region-level)        50.599  46.680  36.715  28.965  20.797  15.025  10.149      
Ceareals                          
Kyrgyzstan - CA-4 (asymmetric)        103.444  50.012  40.683  65.855  80.094  97.452  58.298  0.999***    
Kyrgyzstan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)        103.756  50.377  41.135  65.855  80.143  98.536  61.045      
Tajikistan - CA-4 (asymmetric)        235.757  91.220  60.702  121.218  98.890  76.938  49.999  0.9998***    
Tajikistan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)        242.411  93.150  60.846  123.425  101.778  77.751  53.727      
Kazakhstan - CA-4 (asymmetric)        23.707  8.047  4.472  7.195  7.259  7.511  5.763  0.183    
Kazakhstan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)        57.881  104.728  63.865  21.195  33.521  28.022  16.994      
Uzbekistan - CA-4        16.036  1.194  7.787  11.773  11.105  8.147  7.941  0.367    
Uzbekistan - CIS-12        16.310  1.285  31.625  12.401  11.464  8.483  9.718      Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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Indicator  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  Соrrelation CIS-12-CA-4  Correlation EurAsEC-5-CA-4 
CA-4 (region-level)        16.335  5.632  4.225  6.704  6.183  6.019  4.513  0.195    
EurAsEC-5 (region-level)        3.279  2.770  2.956  1.256  1.959  1.078  0.577    0.494 
CIS-12 (region-level)        6.433  9.592  6.748  3.467  3.892  2.866  2.030      
Education                          
Kyrgyzstan - CA-4 (asymmetric)    60.876  2208.129  2308.311  2936.494  4244.817  4937.213  4894.704  4080.307  2969.916  0.996***    
Kyrgyzstan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)    313.572  2543.056  2603.032  3217.015  4540.178  5252.612  5296.725  4653.761  3638.614      
Tajikistan - CA-4 (asymmetric)    330.357  432.640  344.444  346.884  223.494  172.114  471.511  490.246  572.512  0.943***    
Tajikistan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)    418.496  760.640  519.646  511.642  436.596  387.735  761.239  836.094  958.866      
Kazakhstan - CA-4 (asymmetric)    111.263  423.999  339.235  413.471  429.531  461.898  563.561  565.180  497.756  0.973***    
Kazakhstan - CIS-12 (asymmetric)    1363.071  1776.315  1610.121  1847.333  1917.371  1852.566  2024.142  2037.426  1966.346      
Uzbekistan - CA-4    128.306  378.127  371.260  506.926  689.846  843.901  888.015  771.407  577.463  0.978***    
Uzbekistan - CIS-12    259.718  473.187  427.126  597.354  805.923  1000.328  1110.524  981.889  853.824      
CA-4 (region-level)    70.598  287.345  272.729  347.026  449.539  521.759  563.252  496.377  391.010  0.835***    
EurAsEC-5 (region-level)    137.558  186.512  160.398  186.439  200.465  200.071  229.734  263.436  272.011    0.714** 
CIS-12 (region-level)     160.322  224.561  201.645  233.101  282.045  306.964  354.640  364.780  380.923       
 
Source: SIEI. * significant at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level 
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Central Asia as a sub-region of the post-Soviet world: As a starting point we will analyse 
Central Asia’s “distinctiveness” from the FSU. By doing that, we will look at two types of 
indicators. First, we will compare the size and the direction of change of the indicators of the 
“overall” integration within the CA-4 and the CIS-12 (also analysing the underlying dyadic 
integration indicators). Second, we will look at the asymmetric integration of each of the CA-
4 countries with CA-4 and CIS-12. Now, the indicators of asymmetric integration are con-
structed in a way that the values for CA-4 are smaller than for CIS-12
6 Hence, to get reason-
able statements, one has to subtract from the CIS-12 the CA-4 indicator (i.e. level of asym-
metric integration with “the rest” of the FSU) and compare it with the CA-4 indicator. 
The quantitative findings for the overall level of integration within a region are unambiguous. 
On the one hand, in all the three areas of functional integration (energy, agriculture and edu-
cation), integration levels are higher in Central Asia than in the post-Soviet space in general. 
Similar findings can be established on the dyadic integration level. The absolute leader in the 
electricity market integration is Uzbekistan-Tajikistan. Tajikistan-Turkmenistan and Tajiki-
stan-Kyrgyzstan rank second and third, respectively. For cereals the dominant player in the 
CIS is Kazakhstan: this country is present in all three leading country pairs: Kazakhstan-
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan. Trade in cereals between 
other CIS countries is insignificant in relation to their economy size. The highest levels of 
education integration at the country pair level were demonstrated by Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan.  Large  countries like Russia or Ukraine  are traditionally very 
attractive for students from all over the CIS, but their number remains insignificant in relation 
to these countries’ population. However, the dynamics of sub-regional integration in agricul-
ture and education was negative throughout the 2000s, and the disintegration was faster than 
in CIS-12; in particular, a decline in the education integration index effectively nullified the 
advantages CA-4 had had over CIS-12 (starting from 2005, probably indicating the impact of 
the “Tulp” revolution).  
For both “general” areas (total trade and labour migration) the disadvantage of Central Asia is 
obvious. In migration integration, CA-4 demonstrated a much slower increase in the index 
than CIS-12 or even EurAsEC-5 (in absolute figures), and the intra-regional migration is sig-
nificantly  lower  than  that  directed  towards  Russia.  As  for  total  trade,  the  level  of  intra-
regional trade integration in CA-4 is much lower than in CIS-12 and both values are declin-
ing. It should be stressed that we are referring to intraregional trade lagging behind economic 
growth and the development of intraregional links, not the shrinkage of absolute trade figures. 
But CA-4 demonstrates a slower pace of increase and lower absolute figures of intraregional 
trade as well: in 1999-2008 this trade grew in CIS-12 by 5.8 times, whilst CA-4 increased by 
4.0 times. The pace of increase was slower in CA-4 than in CIS-12 in all years except 2004 
and 2007. The results are, nevertheless, striking, because, if one considers the dyads of the 
FSU  states,  higher  trade  integration  indices  have  been  almost  always  reported  for  the 
neighbouring countries. Central Asia seems to be an exception to this rule.  
                                                 
6 Since the denominator is the same, and the numerator of the indicator of CIS-12 contains that of the value for 
CA-4 Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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From the point of view of the indicators of asymmetric integration, one can observe that in the 
areas of total trade an migration the level of integration of each of the CA-4 countries with 
CA-4 is much smaller than with the CIS-12 (most notably, Russia). This is also true for labour 
migration. For the three functional areas we still find that  Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajiki-
stan maintain links with the CA-4 countries rather than with the rest of CIS-12. This is, how-
ever, not the case for Kazakhstan, which is much more oriented towards the rest of the CIS.  
One should notice that this orientation does not include just Russia – several other post-Soviet 
states also play a significant role. For the trade in cereals and electricity the  indicators for the 
integration with CA-4 have been declining for all countries. The story is somewhat more 
complicated for the educational integration: for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan we 
find that the increase of the asymmetric integration indicator has actually been larger for CA-
4 than for CIS-12 (something similar was observed on the dyadic integration level: the highest 
increase is reported for the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan country pair, followed by Kyrgyzstan-
Kazakhstan). However,  this advantage has been almost lost in 2008, when the decline of 
asymmetric integration with CA-4 has been higher than with the rest of the FSU. 
We can conclude that, even if we can describe Central Asia’s potential for sub-regional inte-
gration (which generally exceeds that of the CIS), this potential tended to decline during the 
past decade. The only sector, where this trend is not entirely obvious, is educational exchange. 
For trade and migration Central Asian countries are linked with Russia rather than with each 
other. However, the negative trend is true of Central Asia as a whole only, and not for indi-
vidual subgroups of countries, as will be discussed. It would appear that the disintegration can 
be explained by friction between Central Asian states over distribution of resources, differ-
ences in their political courses, and strict protectionist policies in foreign trade. On the other 
hand, it could be related to three other factors: (1) the strength of Russia’s position in the re-
gion at a political level (NIKLASSON 2008), which has been enforced by the rivalry of main 
Central Asian states (BOHR 2004) and supports the preservation of the economic ties, but 
also, what is, in our opinion, more important, (2) to the successful advancement of Russian 
business, especially in the last years and (3) the attraction of the Russian labour market with a 
significant inflow of Central Asian workers (which emerged as a spontaneous process without 
direct involvement of the Russian government). Appendix D provides more detailed discus-
sion of the “Central Asia water and energy nexus” and the role of Russia for the Central Asian 
regionalism. However, both internal and external factors have just prevented the relatively 
stronger regionalisation in Central Asia as opposed to the FSU (probably due to the mode by 
which Russian companies enter Central Asian markets, discussed further later in this paper), 
but did not reverse the overall disintegration trend for the trade relations.  
Disintegration may well have shaped the dynamics of formal regional cooperation projects in 
Central Asia during the last fifteen years. Between 1993 and 2002 the Central Asian states 
experimented with three subsequent regional integration agreements (Central Asian Union, 
Central Asian Economic Community and Central Asian Co-operation Organization CACO), 
which, however, did not result in any sensible de-facto cooperation. In 2004 Russia joined 
CACO, and in 2006 the organisation was merged with a larger association of EurAsEC. In 
other words, the most successful attempt at economic unification of Central Asian countries to 
date has been a project with Russia’s participation: the CACO could not compete with an in-
tegration project with a wider post-Soviet format.  
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Central Asia as a sub-region of Eurasia:  The SIEI data only partially confirm that the eco-
nomic linkages between the Central Asian states are more intensive then on the level of the 
FSU. However, one can also consider the same problem from a different perspective: it is 
possible that the basis for comparison selected is not perfect. For instance, the question is 
about the relative importance of the economic links with countries outside the FSU – specifi-
cally China.
7 We use two approaches to perform our analysis.  
First, if, say, China (or any other neighbouring country) is really exerting a decisive influence 
on co-operation in the region, it would be logical to expect significant deviation of Central 
Asia’s integration trends from the post-Soviet mainstream. In that case, any differences be-
tween the development trends of Central Asia and the rest of the post-Soviet world may be 
interpreted as signs of the strengthening of the role of extra-regional actors. But our data sug-
gest that integration in Central Asia almost fully follows the trends observed in the CIS. This 
is true of all integration and macroeconomic indices without exception; any possible devia-
tions relate to dynamics, not the development trends. For trade, education and energy integra-
tion the indicators are also significantly and positively correlated. Therefore, based on these 
indirect indices we can assume that the role of China and other “non-FSU” neighbours falls 
short of that of a dominant player in the region – at least for now. Central Asia remains part of 
the post-Soviet space, also (as shown in the previous sub-section) in rapidly following the 
overall trend of the disintegration in the FSU.  
Of course, the key assumption on which our analysis is based can be criticised.  It is possible 
that, say, China’s influence on Central Asian countries produces the same effects as Russia’s 
and post-Soviet space influence – therefore, we should not expect any deviations in the devel-
opment  trajectory of Central Asia. There are two perspectives of this problem. First is the 
strategic interests of China and Russia in Central Asia and their impact on the economic rela-
tions. TANG (2000) reports that although one could expect a significant level of cooperation 
between Russia and China with respect to Central Asia, it has remained relatively low. During 
the 2000s the cooperation level did increase (through the unfolding of the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organisation), but, on the other hand, there are also more areas of potential or actual 
competition (e.g. pipeline routs). What is important for our analysis is not just the presence or 
absence of the competition, but rather the tools used by both sides in pursuing their strategic 
interests and their impact on regionalisation in Central Asia. It seems to be reasonable and 
consistent with the literature to claim that both China and Russia prefer expanding the eco-
nomic relations with Central Asia as a tool of “soft power”, but the specific implications for 
both countries are different. Second, one has to take the interests of private businesses into 
account, which, given different competitive advantages, may pursue different modes of mar-
ket entry because of purely economic reasons.  
In the area of energy relations China and Russia are likely to have similar goals, which make 
the competition between these two countries possible (both poles desire to secure control over 
                                                 
7 It is certainly possible to mention other potential partners like Iran and Turkey, which also seem to have a keen 
interest in the region and may have influenced its economic development – although China seems currently the 
most interesting country to explore. Some additional information is reported in Appendix D.  Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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Central Asian oil and gas reserves, see BLANK 1995). These goals could be achieved with 
similar tools. However, for the period covered by the SIEI the scope of energy trade between 
CA-4 and China was still relatively small, so it could not have driven our results. In other ar-
eas of trade and migration Russia and China are strikingly different: while China has a pros-
perous and highly efficient sector of the consumer goods industry and an abundance of labour 
resources, Russian manufacturing is mostly uncompetitive and the labour markets experience 
a strong deficit on the supply side. Therefore, both business logic and the search for the opti-
mal economic instruments of power politics should dictate different behaviour (even if the 
objective to expand the economic relations is the same for Russia and China, the tools will be 
different and result in different outcomes for regionalisation in Central Asia itself).  
In the non-energy trade Russian economic influence is often derived from maintaining Soviet 
linkages, which, given the centralised structure of the Soviet economy, did not require signifi-
cant cooperation between states of Central Asia themselves (MEL’NIKOV 2001). In the same 
way, labour flows to Russia are in fact restricting the regionalisation of labour markets in CA-
4. However, Russian business activity in Central Asia is also very successful in several “new” 
economic sectors (e.g. mobile services, where three largest Russian companies MTS, Vym-
pelKom and Megafon are among the key players in all countries of Central Asia).  China also 
has to establish its economic links with Central Asia anew. Here yet another difference be-
tween Russia and China should be taken into account.  
For the Chinese businesses without traditional linkages in the region it is attractive to use cer-
tain Central Asian countries (Kyrgyzstan and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan) as a springboard 
to  the  region’s  economy  as  a  whole.  For  example,  Chinese  consumer  goods  are  directed 
through  the  bazaars  of  Kyrgyzstan,  and  then  re-exported  to the  rest  of Central Asia  (see 
KAMINSKI and RABALLAND 2009 for the empirical evidence). The choice of the spring-
board  can  be  influenced  by  multiple  factors:  ease  of  market  access  (e.g.  bazaar-imports 
friendly regulation in Kyrgyzstan) or political development (e.g. in Kazakhstan the expansion 
of Chinese business coincided with the wave of conflicts between the government of the 
country and foreign investors in the mid-2000s
8). In that case, the activity of these businesses 
would have translated into an increase in intraregional trade (and we will show that this type 
of effect is present if the informal trade is taken into account). Russia, at the same time, is less 
interested in such springboards, as Russia traditionally has strong positions in all these coun-
tries, and is less active in consumer markets (where this springboard strategy makes sense), 
and, as KUZ’MIN (2007) shows, directly accesses all markets of CA-4 at the same time.  
Furthermore, our analysis did not differentiate between the external influence by post-Soviet 
countries on Central Asia and the internal factors, which might be similar in CIS-12 and CA-
4 and, therefore, lead to similar development trends. While there is no way to directly infer 
the answer to this question from the SIEI dataset, the anecdotal evidence discussed in Appen-
dix D and the theoretical discussion above allows us to make several conjectures. The most 
probable scenario seems to be the simultaneous presence of both factors. While the “water 
                                                 
8 Chinese companies actively used the conflicts to acquire assets. A good example is the case of PetroKazakh-
stan, originally owned by a Canadian company, but later purchased by the Chinese (who were ready to re-sell 
part of the share to the government of Kazakhstan) and Russians.   
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and energy” nexus in Central Asia described in the previous section certainly reduces the 
level of regionalisation among CA-4 countries, a similarly powerful force is the strong eco-
nomic and political position of Russia – specifically, of the Russian business, more than of the 
Russian government (once again: powerful enough to keep the relative level of the linkages 
between CA-4 states and Russia as opposed to those between the CA-4 states high, but not to 
prevent the overall decline of intra-regional trade in CIS-12). However, one should also men-
tion the third factor: the economic expansion of Kazakhstan, which, as we will show, is not 
limited to the CA-4 region and actually binds Kazakhstan closer to the FSU.  
It is possible that the impact of the extra-regional agents resulted not in a change of path of 
the integration or disintegration, but rather in a change of speed. Specifically, one could ex-
pect faster disintegration of the Central Asian region than of the rest of the FSU, if the influ-
ence of extra-regional players (China or Turkey) were increasing. However, in this case, first, 
one would not observe the correlation between FSU and Central Asia in the areas where re-
gional integration showed a positive trend (like labour migration) – but there seems to be a 
strong correlation in our data (the correlation indicators exceed 0.5, although they are insig-
nificant). And second, the speed of “internal” disintegration within Central Asia would be 
more slowly than that between Central Asian countries and Russia – but the SIEI data demon-
strate  that  the latter  in  fact declined  more slowly  than the  former.  So,  even  if  the  extra-
regional agents indeed caused “fast track” disintegration in Central Asia, it has been “just” 
enough to dissipate the specific sub-regional integration advantages, but “not enough” to re-
duce its links to the FSU significantly. 
We also use a direct approach to compare the scope of the regionalisation. For this purpose 
we use the Chinese trade statistics data (it is advantageous since it resolves the problem of the 
unreported “mirror imports” in the statistics of Central Asia – which will be discussed in the 
next section) to calculate the indicator of asymmetric integration of three Central Asian states 
with China (we ignore Uzbekistan, since there is no data for its trade with CIS-12, and thus 
the comparison was flawed). Since in many cases imported Chinese goods are re-exported to 
other Central Asian states, country-wise asymmetric integration indicators may be misleading, 
and so we also calculate the overall asymmetric integration indicator of CA-4 with China 
(looking at dyadic integration is not so interesting, as the variable is likely to be very small 
because of enormous foreign trade of the Chinese economy). This variable is compared with 
the asymmetric integration of CA-4 with the CIS-12 (see Table 2).  
Our key findings still support the main claim of this paper: even in 2008 the asymmetric inte-
gration with the CIS-12 was higher than with China. If one calculates the asymmetric integra-
tion index with the “rest of CIS-12” (i.e. excluding CA-4 itself), it is still larger than with 
China, although the difference is rather small (0.227). However, in the dynamic perspective 
situation looks differently: the CIS-12 indicator is (very slowly) decreasing, and the China 
indicator is rapidly increasing, especially during 2007-2008. So, although at the moment CA-4 
is part of the CIS rather than an “extension” of a new China- centred region, the results can 
change in the future. The correlation of the asymmetric integration indicators with CIS-12 and 
China is negative, but not significant (what is not surprising given the very short time series). 
The growth is probably mostly driven by the import of the bazaar goods from China to Cen-
tral Asia, which we will discuss in the next section. Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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Table 2: Trade integration of CA-4 with CIS-12 and China  
Indicator  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Kyrgyzstan-China (asymmetric)  0.157  0.203  0.318  0.472  0.836  1.037  1.733 
Tajikistan-China (asymmetric)  0.009  0.024  0.033  0.069  0.109  0.138  0.307 
Kazakhstan-China (asymmetric)  0.100  0.131  0.121  0.135  0.119  0.152  0.147 
СA-4-China (asymmetric)  0.097  0.128  0.125  0.145  0.144  0.184  0.218 
СА -4-CIS-12 (asymmetric)  0.290  0.290  0.290  0.259  0.254  0.268  0.259 
Source: own calculations based on SIEI and NBS China  
Kazakhstan: the second integration core in the post-Soviet space: It is generally agreed 
that regionalisation in the CIS, if present, is based on asymmetric economic links with Russia 
being a dominant player (which is inevitable, bearing in mind in the size of the Russian econ-
omy) and very weak interconnection between other countries (see e.g. FREINKMAN et al. 
2004; KOROBKOV, 2007).  
In the meantime, our data indicates that a new centre of regionalisation is emerging in the 
post-Soviet space: Kazakhstan. In particular, we can point to two directions of Kazakhstan’s 
development as an independent integration core whose activities are not influenced by Russia. 
The first direction is labour migration. Kazakhstan attracts workforce from the rest of the 
post-Soviet space for many reasons: its rapid economic growth in the 2000s, the problems 
encountered by labour migrants in Russian society, etc. Kazakhstan is especially attractive for 
migrants from its closest neighbours, the Central Asian states. This is particularly true for the 
Kyrgyzstan: the  enormous growth of migration to Kazakhstan made this country pair the 
leader of the dyadic integration in 2008 in the CIS (it is also driven by smaller population of 
the target country Kazakhstan: while, for example, for Tajikistan (and Kyrgyzstan as well) 
Russia remains an important destination, the share of migrants from these countries in Rus-
sian population is negligible). From 2002, Azerbaijan also demonstrated sustained growth of 
labour migration to Kazakhstan (this country pair ranked second).  
The second direction is trade integration. The only country pair which has no common border 
but is leading in terms of total trade indices is Kazakhstan-Ukraine (see Appendix B); notably, 
this pair also demonstrated the biggest increase in trade integration in the post-Soviet space in 
1999-2008. In other words, unlike the situation in migration integration, Kazakhstan shows 
signs of activity outside Central Asia. In particular, as mentioned, all leading country pairs 
trading in cereals include Kazakhstan; this trade covers Central Asia (even including Turk-
menistan) and the Caucasus. Kazakhstan’s integration with Caucasus involves, on the one 
hand, grain transit through Azerbaijan and subsequently Iran and Georgia to foreign markets  
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in North Africa and Middle East, and second, grain exports through Baku to three states of 
Southern Caucasus themselves, with the first factor being far more important.
9  
It should be noted that as in the Russian case the position of Kazakhstan in the regional inte-
gration is asymmetric. While for Kyrgyzstan (and to a much lesser extent for Tajikistan) Ka-
zakhstan  is  an  important  trade  and  labour  migration  partner,  for  Kazakhstan  itself  these 
“smaller states” are of lesser importance, with economic linkages being directed towards Rus-
sia and CIS-12. Therefore it is not surprising that the asymmetric integration indicators report 
very low integration of Kazakhstan in CA-4. In other words, the potential integration core is 
attractive for other states of Central Asia and Caucasus, but itself has only limited economic 
concerns in the region.  
The economic expansion of Kazakhstan in Central Asia and, what is even more important, 
beyond, in other parts of the CIS, challenges some of the predictions of the literature, which 
so far has interpreted the CIS as a “Russian-centred” complex with the potential “challengers” 
in the states of GUAM (BUZAN and WAEVER 2003). Although political relations between 
Russia and Kazakhstan are almost flawless, in the economic area competition is present (for 
example, the contest between Astana and Chelyabinsk for the transit terminal of Lufthansa 
Cargo in 2008, which was heavily influenced by the Russian government). Therefore studying 
regionalisation can result in a re-assessment of the regional dynamics which other approaches 
outlined above are interested in.  
 
5  The role of informal trade 
Since the SIEI data explicitly concentrate on taking just the official statistics into account, the 
analysis so far ignored a serious problem, which may result in significant under-estimation of 
the regional connections in Central Asia – that of the informal trade. The ability (and partly 
the willingness) of Central Asian nations to monitor their borders is incomplete, and as a re-
sult official customs statistics only partly reflect the actual trade flows. While there is no per-
fect solution to the problem of informal trade, we will attempt to use several measures to at 
least obtain the rough measure of the impact of informal linkages on regionalisation. 
The basic approach we use is based on mirror statistics and is described in Appendix A. Spe-
cifically, there are two variations of the analysis. The first simply employs the standard mirror 
import concept with several variations accounting for different data sources. Using these data, 
we have re-calculated all trade indicators from the SIEI database including mirror import gap. 
The estimates are reported in Table 3. Basically, the results do not seem to change: one finds 
an even somewhat faster “dissipation” of regionalisation in both the CIS and the CA-4 re-
gions. The time series obtained by adjusting for informal trade exhibit an almost perfect corre-
lation with the original time series (in most cases well above 0.99, and always significantly 
                                                 
9 Although it is not reported in this paper, given the nature of the SIEI data, Kazakhstan also increased its in-
vestment activity in Russia, CA-4 and Caucasian states, specifically in the banking and agricultural sectors.  Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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correlated at 1% level). Central Asia still disintegrates along with the CIS and exhibits a lower 
integration level than the CIS in general. 
Table 3: Impact of informal trade on the trade integration in CA-4 and CIS-12 





Approach 1                        
Kyrgyzstan - CA-4 (asym-
metric)  0.108  0.085  0.115  0.125  0.148  0.156  0.145  0.135  0.122  0.089  0.9036 
Kyrgyzstan  -  CIS-12 
(asymmetric)  0.386  0.425  0.369  0.369  0.365  0.406  0.409  0.418  0.439  0.408  0.8130 
Tajikistan  -  CA-4  (asym-
metric)  0.064  0.073  0.073  0.057  0.073  0.083  0.090  0.080  0.094  0.066  0.9977 
Tajikistan  -  CIS-12 
(asymmetric)  0.705  0.831  0.628  0.558  0.457  0.448  0.460  0.435  0.461  0.416  0.9996 
Kazakhstan  -  CA-4 
(asymmetric)  0.014  0.010  0.011  0.011  0.012  0.012  0.010  0.009  0.010  0.008  0.9945 
Kazakhstan  -  CIS-12 
(asymmetric)  0.257  0.322  0.332  0.268  0.271  0.270  0.239  0.236  0.250  0.239  0.9983 
CA-4 (region-level)  0.060  0.045  0.043  0.038  0.036  0.037  0.031  0.028  0.034  0.029  0.9990 
EurAsEC-5 (region-level)  0.124  0.131  0.123  0.112  0.113  0.117  0.092  0.092  0.096  0.093  0.9962 
CIS-12 (region-level)  0.212  0.219  0.208  0.190  0.194  0.195  0.169  0.166  0.169  0.165  0.9944 
Over-valuation of intra-regional trade without informal trade 
CA-4 (region-level)  -1%  -1%  -1%  -1%  1%  1%  -1%  -2%  1%  2%    
EurAsEC-5 (region-level)  2%  3%  4%  4%  5%  5%  5%  3%  2%  2%    
CIS-12 (region-level)  1%  2%  3%  3%  3%  4%  3%  2%  2%  -1%    
Approach 2                        
Kyrgyzstan - CA-4 (asym-
metric)  0.109  0.080  0.108  0.117  0.142  0.151  0.141  0.132  0.120  0.087  0.9191 
Kyrgyzstan  -  CIS-12 
(asymmetric)  0.387  0.399  0.346  0.344  0.350  0.393  0.397  0.408  0.431  0.401  0.8500 
Tajikistan  -  CA-4  (asym-
metric)  0.065  0.073  0.073  0.058  0.077  0.083  0.090  0.080  0.094  0.067  0.9954 
Tajikistan  -  CIS-12 
(asymmetric)  0.712  0.826  0.628  0.558  0.480  0.448  0.460  0.435  0.461  0.422  0.9979 
Kazakhstan  -  CA-4 
(asymmetric)  0.014  0.010  0.011  0.011  0.012  0.012  0.010  0.009  0.009  0.007  0.9958 
Kazakhstan  -  CIS-12 
(asymmetric)  0.244  0.311  0.328  0.261  0.263  0.263  0.232  0.229  0.243  0.232  0.9968 
CA-4 (region-level)  0.058  0.043  0.042  0.037  0.035  0.036  0.030  0.027  0.033  0.029  0.9984 
EurAsEC-5 (region-level)  0.122  0.129  0.121  0.111  0.112  0.116  0.090  0.091  0.094  0.091  0.9974 
CIS-12 (region-level)  0.207  0.216  0.204  0.187  0.191  0.191  0.165  0.163  0.165  0.161  0.9954 
Over-valuation of intra-regional trade without informal trade 
CA-4 (region-level)  3%  3%  0%  2%  4%  4%  2%  1%  4%  5%    
EurAsEC-5 (region-level)  4%  4%  5%  5%  6%  7%  6%  5%  4%  4%    
CIS-12 (region-level)  3%  4%  5%  5%  5%  6%  5%  4%  4%  2%    
Taking bazaar trade into account, Approach 1 
CA-4 (region-level)  0.066  0.051  0.048  0.044  0.043  0.047  0.042  0.049  0.062  0.086  0.0944 
Under-valuation  of  the 
intra-regional  trade 
without bazaar trade  10%  12%  11%  17%  17%  27%  34%  71%  80%  191%    
Taking bazaar trade into account, Approach 2 
CA-4 (region-level)  0.063  0.049  0.047  0.043  0.041  0.045  0.041  0.047  0.060  0.084  0.0739 
Under-valuation  of  the 
intra-regional  trade 
without bazaar trade  10%  12%  11%  17%  17%  26%  36%  71%  80%  191%    
Source: own calculation based on SIEI, COMTRADE and CISSTAT 
Note: all correlation coefficients with exception to those with bazaar trade are significant at 1% level 
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Nevertheless, the analysis still requires an additional serious correction, since it ignores yet 
another specific feature of Central Asian regionalisation: the use of the Kyrgyzstan as the “en-
trepot” for Chinese consumer goods, which has been described in detail by KAMINSKI and 
RABALLAND  (2009)  and  KAMINSKI  and  MITRA  (2010).  As  we  have  already  shown 
above, the trade relations of Kyrgyzstan with China are enormous and growing. From this 
point of view it is reasonable to doubt the ability of the relatively small Kyrgyz economy to 
consume the voluminous imports from China domestically. Rather it has been claimed that 
imports from China are re-exported to other countries of Central Asia. KAMINSKI and MI-
TRA (2010) point out that the simple analysis of mirror import data does not capture the 
whole extent of this intra-regional trade. Hence, we have to make a correction for the “Chi-
nese re-exports” in the internal trade of Central Asia. 
The results are striking (see Table 3). On the one hand, we find that under consideration of the 
re-exported goods the level of trade integration in CA-4 is much higher than in the reference 
case: the increase of the index in the last years is almost threefold. The huge difference is 
mostly associated with the period of 2006-2008. On the other hand, until 2007, the regional 
trade integration even under consideration of re-exports was declining, although somewhat 
more slowly. The situation did change in 2007, when the trade integration in CA-4 started 
growing. This is likely to have been caused by the huge expansion of the Chinese exports to 
Kyrgyzstan, which we have discussed above. It is interesting to notice that the indicators in-
cluding bazaar goods trade are even uncorrelated with the “original” SIEI indicators.  
Nevertheless, even during this period the CA-4 trade integration has been significantly lower 
than that in the CIS-12. Thus, our key conclusion still remains the same; however, our as-
sessment of the potential dynamics should be adjusted. If the trade flows from China continue 
growing and will be localised in Central Asia, one can expect that at some point regionalisa-
tion in CA-4 will exceed that in CIS-12. Whether it will be the case, depends upon the variety 
of reasons, especially the ability of other Central Asian countries to absorb Chinese exports, 
which is in turn determined by their economic dynamics. Yet another factor of significant 
importance is the re-exports of Chinese goods to Russia – if they increase, the same re-exports 
from  China  will  actually  intensify  the  interconnections  within  CIS-12  and  “keep  Central 
Asia” closer to Russia.  
 
6  Conclusion  
This paper attempted to look at the process of regional integration in Central Asia using a new 
comprehensive dataset of the SIEI. Our goal was, specifically, to understand, whether Central 
Asia is in any respect “different” from the rest of the former Soviet Union: first, whether the 
degree of regional integration between the countries of Central Asia is higher, than between, 
say Russia and Central Asian states, and second, whether the trends of economic integration 
in Central Asia are different from the rest of the FSU (suggesting, for instance, an  influence 
of an external party like China). So far we are cautiously able to answer no to both of the 
questions. While Central Asia has exhibited higher level of integration in some functional Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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areas in the later 1990s, in the 2000s the decline of this integration was more pronounced than 
in the rest of the FSU and currently the advantage seems partly to have been lost. Moreover, 
the difference between Central Asian countries and the rest of the FSU has been rather the 
speed of (dis)integration than the direction of changes. 
It should also be noted that regionalisation in Central Asia is much higher if one takes infor-
mal trade into account. Even under these conditions it is lower than in the CIS-12 region, but 
the disintegration trend is by far less pronounced. This informal integration is strongly linked 
to the re-exports of Chinese bazaar goods through the Kyrgyz Republic. (Thus, it can be prone 
to  further  disintegration  as  a  result  of  strengthening  the  execution  within  the  Russia-
Kazakhstan-Belarus Customs Union.) The level of economic integration of CA-4 with China 
is also still smaller than with the rest of CIS-12, however, it is steadily increasing, particularly 
during 2007-2008. It could suggest that the static results reported so far may change in the 
foreseeable future, with China emerging as the main economic partner for CA-4. The impact 
of informal trade on the demand for formal regionalism and intergovernmental cooperation is, 
however, ambiguous and depends on the functioning of the trade networks and their ability to 
overcome existing barriers. 
Another trend we were able to find is the evolution of Kazakhstan into the second integration 
core in the CIS. Kazakhstan is the leader in labour migration and student exchange. This was 
made possible by its high GDP level, unmatched by any other Central Asian country, which 
makes Kazakhstan very attractive to its neighbours in terms of trade and migration and in-
creases its importance as a source of investment. The emergence of Kazakhstan as an integra-
tion core could have particular importance for Kyrgyzstan, which even now has very strong 
economic and political ties to its northern neighbour. However, even here we believe that cau-
tion is necessary because of the natural resource-driven nature of Kazakhstani strong eco-
nomic growth in the 2000s, which may be unsustainable in the future.  
Our results seem to be consistent with the findings of the RSC approach; however, in our 
opinion it would be too simplistic to reduce the stability of the economic ties between Russia 
and the Central Asian countries to just the use of “soft power” instruments by the Russian 
politics. In many cases the most successful results have been achieved by private business 
without any political motivation, or even in the areas where Russia is rather restrictive (e.g. 
migration). It is also the case that one should not interpret the economic interdependence as an 
indicator of the Russian “power” and “influence” in the region – the logic of private Russian 
companies does not automatically map the objectives of the Russian leadership, and the eco-
nomic linkages do not necessarily effectively constraint the regional autocrats. On the other 
hand, the existence of the economic ties will certainly keep the security problems of the FSU 
countries sufficiently interdependent to keep the RSC in existence. But, what is more interest-
ing and to our knowledge not documented in the literature before, this complex – at least in 
the economic area – is likely to become less Russia-centred because of the increasing impor-
tance of Kazakhstan. Our results may also indicate that the cultural, political and institutional 
heterogeneity of the FSU should not be overestimated, and the impact of Soviet legacies – 
underestimated. Nevertheless, our results suggest that in this area strong changes could be 
expected even in the near future, if the trend towards increasing economic ties with China 
persists.  
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A: Informal trade in the CIS – Estimation approach 
 
A1. Mirror imports 
Since exports are reported at fob prices, and imports at cif prices (i.e. include the costs of freight), the trade flow 
from one country to another should be smaller in the customs statistics of the exporter than of the importer. If the 
import of country A from country B reported by A is smaller than export from B to A reported by B, it may 
serve as an indication of the informal trade, and the difference between export and import flows reported is re-
ferred to as import gap. In the first stage of our analysis we have calculated the trade gap for the trade between 
all CIS countries in the period of 1999-2008, using the data reported by the CIS Interstate Statistical Committee 
(CISSTAT). The results are reported in Table A1. As one can see, the unreported import is at least in some cases 
indeed large: specifically, for Southern Caucasus countries and in the early 2000s for Moldova (where the driv-
ing force may be the existence of non-recognised states like Transniestria).  
In the same way, we evaluate the import gap of each CIS country vis-a-vis the rest of the world (ROW), includ-
ing non-CIS trade partners. In this case we apply two different methods. The first subtracts the value of imports 
of a CIS country from the ROW reported by CISSTAT from the export of the ROW to this CIS country reported 
by COMTRADE (using “World (Aggregate)” entry of this dataset). Applying two different sources of data for 
the comparative analysis of trade flows can be problematic, yet in most cases COMTRADE entries and CIS-
STAT accounts are very similar (this is not the case for all CIS countries: Georgia, e.g., is a notable exception). 
The advantage of CISSTAT is that it provides systematic data for a somewhat larger set of countries, specifically 
(which is very important for our purpose) including Tajikistan. The results are reported in Table A2. Azerbaijan 
and Moldova continue reporting significant import gap. However, unlike the CISSTAT data for the intra-FSU 
trade, one also finds an enormous trade gap for the Kyrgyz Republic, which dramatically increased towards the 
end of the 2000s. 
However, simply taking the aggregate imports and exports can be problematic, because the mirror import gap 
with some partners can be “offset” by high freight costs for other partners. It is as a matter of fact that the case 
for some countries Table A2 reports no import gap, while Table A1 (referring to a subset of the trade flows) does 
show that the trade gap exist. Thus, we have also used another, more detailed approach: we calculated the import 
gap for each exporter to each CIS country for each year, this time using only the COMTRADE data. Specifi-
cally, we considered the countries for which both the entry for the export flow reported by the exporter and im-
port flow reported by the importer are available.
10 The problem with the second approach is that it is likely to be 
overly sensitive to the fluctuations in reporting of particular countries, which may be not reliable even in the case 
of the exporters (at least in some cases import gaps of significant size have been observed for countries remote 
from the CIS and unlikely to have developed informal trade networks in the region, like Latin America). We 
were also forced to drop Tajikistan, as there are no data of this in COMTRADE for most years.  The results are 
reported in Table A3 and exceed significantly the outcomes of the first approach for all countries: however, the 
qualitative conclusions seem to be almost the same. 
Now, the adjustments of all trade indicators proceed as follows. We add the size of the mirror import gap for 
particular country pair (or region) to the numerator (the mirror import gap is either zero if exports are smaller 
than imports or exports minus imports otherwise). In the denominator we either add the total mirror import gap 
with ROW from Approach 1, and in this case we also increase it, if necessary, to be at least equal to the size of 
the mirror import gap with CIS-12 (because of the problems mentioned above), or the mirror import gap with 
ROW from Approach 2. Thus, we obtain two different sets of indicators, which are, however, highly correlated. 
 
                                                 
10 In some cases the presence of just the export flow entry reported by the exporter may indicate a trade gap as 
well, if the goods and services sold from a country A to country B “completely disappeared”  and have not 
been even included in country B’s statistics; however, we ignore these entries, and their impact is usually 
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Table A1: Share of mirror import gap from CIS-12 in total imports from CIS-12 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Armenia  5.59%  2.45%  0.83%  0.47%  8.99%  16.90%  15.42%  13.19%  21.27%  6.23% 
Azerbaijan  5.13%  4.35%  4.11%  8.99%  9.04%  16.14%  26.05%  24.74%  40.21%  51.44% 
Belarus  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.05%  0.00%  0.00%  0.14%  0.00% 
Georgia  24.23%  11.42%  14.27%  3.71%  13.52%  8.76%  5.45%  na  2.12%  6.30% 
Kazakhstan  0.91%  0.17%  0.21%  0.19%  0.07%  0.01%  0.07%  0.60%  2.77%  0.37% 
Kyrgyz 
Rep.  3.97%  0.88%  3.81%  0.12%  0.19%  4.03%  8.90%  8.44%  3.22%  3.12% 
Moldova  63.11%  65.29%  65.70%  53.01%  51.59%  51.51%  44.02%  44.18%  53.63%  61.22% 
Russia  0.12%  0.21%  0.11%  0.45%  0.56%  0.44%  0.54%  0.48%  0.97%  0.52% 
Tajikistan  11.99%  3.86%  0.34%  1.39%  0.00%  0.79%  0.55%  0.00%  0.47%  0.00% 
Ukraine  0.32%  0.03%  0.24%  0.36%  0.18%  0.08%  0.27%  7.40%  0.20%  16.40% 
Source: own calculation, based on the data of CISSTAT 
 
Table A2: Share of mirror import gap from the ROW in total imports from the ROW, approach 1 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Armenia  22.75%  29.51%  3.56%  29.30%  29.54%  58.36%  37.97%  80.37%  50.57%  67.10% 
Azerbaijan  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Belarus  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Georgia  31.31%  20.87%  21.85%  16.98%  31.32%  15.23%  1.99%  0.00%  0.00%  8.11% 
Kazakhstan  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  5.20%  6.15%  5.09%  3.66%  2.75%  2.01% 
Kyrgyz Rep.  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  11.19%  26.35%  49.22%  76.53%  112.73%  139.73%  194.78% 
Moldova  54.90%  35.63%  39.06%  26.74%  26.60%  32.30%  22.26%  20.13%  9.86%  19.01% 
Russia  13.02%  25.35%  24.21%  23.66%  30.28%  33.87%  28.60%  17.57%  13.18%  6.80% 
Tajikistan  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  3.88% 
Ukraine  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  2.60%  3.16%  11.43%  6.88%  1.83% 
Source: own calculation, based on the data of CISSTAT and COMTRADE 
 
Table A3: Share of mirror import gap from the ROW in total imports from the ROW, approach 2 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Armenia  62.33%  60.19%  57.96%  61.64%  70.80%  86.77%  88.07%  112.12%  73.23%  86.07% 
Azerbaijan  3.73%  2.35%  2.52%  4.60%  5.18%  6.14%  6.53%  6.60%  4.93%  2.91% 
Belarus  1.81%  1.07%  3.01%  2.34%  2.41%  2.59%  4.32%  4.33%  3.60%  4.47% 
Georgia  46.63%  37.03%  36.64%  29.12%  44.43%  31.54%  17.99%  16.05%  12.81%  22.14% 
Kazakhstan  21.76%  16.40%  5.29%  10.83%  19.05%  19.90%  21.61%  19.05%  17.21%  16.41% 
Kyrgyz Rep.  na  23.80%  24.52%  37.04%  42.47%  64.41%  92.16%  129.73%  154.77%  217.54% 
Moldova  60.17%  42.23%  44.28%  35.58%  35.78%  38.62%  29.99%  29.87%  22.14%  33.41% 
Russia  22.07%  32.75%  31.07%  29.81%  36.47%  39.69%  35.01%  25.42%  20.94%  15.13% 
Tajikistan  na  5.47%  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Ukraine  10.72%  11.02%  15.92%  16.20%  14.96%  18.81%  16.14%  24.12%  21.49%  19.11% Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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Source: own calculation, based on the data of CISSTAT and COMTRADE 
A.2. Bazaar goods trade 
Our approach is derived from KAMINSKI (2008), who identified the set of five commodities,
11 which are likely 
to be those re-exported from Kyrgyzstan. We first use the COMTRADE data to find out the overall export of 
theses commodities (using trade statistics of the exporters and thus covering also the import gap of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, which is mostly due to the trade with China).  We also calculate this import flow for other Central 
Asian countries (actually, given the data in COMTRADE, only for Kazakhstan). The share of Kyrgyzstan in 
these overall imports of bazaar goods is assumed to be proportional to the republic’s share in the GDP of Central 
Asia. The remaining part of the trade flow to Kyrgyzstan is assumed to be re-exported. Then we adjust the trade 
integration index for CA-4, adding the size of these re-exports to the intra-regional trade to the total intra-
regional trade (the denominator does not change, since it already contains the mirror import gap). Since we do 
not know exactly which Central Asian countries receive the re-exports from the Kyrgyz Republic, the asymmet-
ric integration indicators cannot be adjusted. Of course, it works only under specific assumptions: that no re-
exports are registered by the Central Asian customs once re-sold from the Kyrgyz Republic (which may well be 
likely) and that there are no re-exports to other countries (especially Russia – which, as KAMINSKI and RA-
BALLAND (2009) show, also receives goods from Kyrgyz bazaars). So, we rather over-estimate the extent of 
regional integration in CA-4. 
                                                 
11 SITC 65, 83, 84, 85, 89 Subnational Resource Curse: Do Economic or Political Institutions Matter? 
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Appendix B: Matrix of dyadic integration indicators, example 
 
Table B1: Trade integration, dyadic indicators, 2008 
 
    1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
Azerbaijan  1  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.022  0.006  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.002  na  na  0.008 
Armenia  2  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.019  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.000  na  na  0.004 
Belarus  3  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.006  0.001  0.009  0.062  0.002  na  na  0.042 
Georgia  4  0.022  0.019  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000  na  na  0.009 
Kazakhstan  5  0.006  0.000  0.006  0.001  0.000  0.009  0.003  0.035  0.005  na  na  0.032 
Kyrgyz Rep  6  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.009  0.000  0.001  0.004  0.007  na  na  0.001 
Moldova  7  0.000  0.000  0.009  0.001  0.003  0.001  0.000  0.003  0.000  na  na  0.013 
Russia  8  0.004  0.002  0.062  0.001  0.035  0.004  0.003  0.000  0.002  na  na  0.062 
Tajikistan  9  0.002  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.005  0.007  0.000  0.002  0.000  na  na  0.001 
Turkmenistan  10  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Uzbekistan  11  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Ukraine  12  0.008  0.004  0.042  0.009  0.032  0.001  0.013  0.062  0.001  na  na  0.000 
 
Source: System of Indicators of Eurasian Integration Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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Appendix C: Main components of the SIEI 
The dyadic integration indicators relate the size of the trade and factor flows between countries to the measure of 
the size of their economies. For example, for grain trade the sum of grain exports and imports connecting two 
countries is related to the size of their GDP. Thus, the indicator increases if the trade flows between countries 
grow faster than their economies. For the indicators of labour and educational migration SIEI relates the size of 
the factor flows not to the GDP, but to the size of the population. It certainly can create an upward bias for the 
integration indicators, since the population grows much more slowly than the GDP, a smaller growth of trade 
flows is required to actually generate an increase in the integration index. However, for the purpose of this paper 
we are interested in the comparative dynamics across different countries of regions, rather than in the explicit 
comparison of different integration sectors.  
For total trade integration SIEI uses a somewhat different approach, calculating two indicators of integration and 
using their average. In both of them the size of trade flows between countries is measured by the sum of trade 
turnovers (exports and imports) reported by both countries - thus the SIEI attempts to use the complete informa-
tion available for the purpose of the calculation of its indicators. However, the denominator is in the first case, as 
in all other goods trade indicators, GDP, and in the second – the sum of the overall trade turnover with the rest of 
the world of both countries. Thus, the first indicator compares the speed of growth of the intra-dyadic trade with 
the GDP of the dyads, making it consistent with other SIEI indicators; the second indicator looks at the change 
of the share of the intra-dyadic trade in the overall foreign trade of the dyad. Taking an average of both indica-
tors is without loss of generality, since they are highly correlated; the separate analysis of each of the indicators 
yields qualitatively identical results.  
The indicators of asymmetric integration are an important element for the analysis of post-Soviet integration 
given the extreme asymmetries in size of the economies, population and trade between countries. For example, 
the dyadic integration index of, say, Russia and Tajikistan is likely to be very small, even if for Tajikistan Russia 
is the key partner – simply because for Russia Tajikistan is fairly unimportant and the huge overall GDP (popu-
lation, trade) of Russia will “dilute” the index. Hence, one would not be able to observe the real dependence of 
Tajikistan on the economic relations with Russia. Therefore, the SIEI contains the set of indicators, where the 
factor flows between a country and a region (say, CIS) are related just to the size of the economy (overall trade 
or population) of this particular country, allowing us to measure the unilateral dependence of a country on the 
economic connections with the region. 
The final set of indicators measures the level of integration within a particular region. It simply compares the 
intra-regional trade and factor flows with the size of the economies (population or the overall trade of the re-
gion). Thus, three types of indicators provide three points of view on the regionalisation in the FSU: the extent of 
mutual interdependence between individual countries; the extent of unilateral dependence of individual coun-
tries on particular regions; and the extent of the concentration of trade and factor flows within regions. 
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Table C1. Integration indicators in the EDB’s SIEI   
Indicator  Country pair  Country-to-region  Region 
A. General market integration 
Mutual trade  (Country’s share in the 
total foreign trade turn-
over of the country pair + 
country’s share in the 
total GDP of the country 
pair) *100 / 2 
(Country’s share in trade 
with the region in the 
total foreign trade turn-
over of the country + 
country’s share in trade 
with the region in the 
country’s GDP) *100 / 2 
(Share of the countries’ 
mutual trade in their total 
foreign trade turnover + 
share of the countries’ 
mutual trade in the re-
gion’s total GDP) *100 / 
2 
Migration  Share of labour migrants 
from each country of the 
pair working in the other 
country(thousands peo-
ple)  in the total popula-
tion of the country pair 
(million people) 
Share of labour migrants 
from the country working 
in the region (thousands 
people) in the total popu-
lation of the country (mil-
lion people) 
Share of labour migrants 
from all countries of the 
region working in other 
the countries of the region  
(thousands people) in the 
total population of the 
region (million people) 
B. Functional integration in key markets 
Electric power  Volume of trade in elec-
tric power between the 
countries of the pair 
(thousands kW/h) / their 
total GDP (million USD) 
Volume of trade in elec-
tric power between the 
country and the region 
(thousands kW/h) / the 
country’s GDP (million 
USD) 
Volume of trade in elec-
tric power between the 
countries of the region 
(thousands kW/h) / the 
region’s GDP (million 
USD) 
Agriculture  Volume of trade in cere-
als between the countries 
of the pair (tonnes) / their 
total GDP (million USD) 
Volume of trade in cere-
als between the country 
and the region (tonnes) / 
the country’s GDP (mil-
lion USD) 
Volume of trade in cere-
als between the countries 
of the region (tonnes) / 
the region’s GDP (million 
USD) 
Education  Number of students from 
each country of the pair 
studying in the other 
country (person) / total 
population of the country 
pair  (million people) 
Number of students from 
the country studying in 
the region (person) / 
population of the country 
(million people) 
Number of students from 
all countries of the region 
studying in other the 
countries of the region 
(person) / total population 
of the region (million 
people) 
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Appendix D: Anecdotal evidence 
 
D.1. Central Asia water and energy nexus  
The so-called “Central Asia water and energy nexus” represents the most striking and practically the most im-
portant venue for the highly painful international conflicts in the region (see EDB 2008 for details). Seasonal 
differences in the demand for water and energy have generated conflicting approaches to the utilisation of trans-
boundary river resources. The problem is exacerbated by the infamous crisis of the shrinking Aral Sea, the global 
consequences of this disaster and by the winter floods caused by excessive reservoir drainage. Among other 
problems, this results in catastrophic flooding in downstream areas in winter and droughts in summer and acute 
power shortages in the upstream countries during winter.  
Geopolitical changes and the transformation of the regional economy dismantled stable systems of water utilisa-
tion and energy exchange in the 1990s. The region’s food and energy supplies also came under threat. Down-
stream countries need water for agriculture, while upstream countries tend to withhold water for electricity pro-
duction during winter. When several reservoirs are drained simultaneously, it results both in catastrophic flood-
ing and water-logging of the territories located below the Tajik and Kyrgyz hydro power plants and water short-
ages during the growing season. This last problem is most critical for the Central Asian countries and is a key 
source of conflict between the upstream countries (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), which exploit the energy poten-
tial of the rivers, and the downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), which need water 
from the rivers for agriculture. Agriculture is the biggest consumer of water, so the water utilisation model in the 
upstream countries not only affects farmers in the downstream countries, but indeed the whole economy, as the 
social and economic importance of agriculture in Central Asia is paramount. Agriculture’s capacity to sustain 
Central Asia’s population is directly dependent upon the productivity and efficiency of irrigated land, since most 
people (from 43 per cent in Kazakhstan up to 75 per cent in Tajikistan) live in rural areas. 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have found that their attempts to build the large hydro complexes that change trans-
boundary water flow are perceived by other countries as a threat to their national interests. Meanwhile, large 
investments  in  construction  of  hydropower  plants  are  only  possible  with  consent  and  cooperation  with 
neighbouring countries and external forces, particularly Russia, China, and the international development banks. 
External players exert significant influence on regional cooperation and conflict. When regional cooperation 
institutions are weak and domestic funds are not sufficient, the support of the international community becomes 
vitally important for Central Asian countries. 
The interweaving and interdependency of the region’s hard infrastructure is well illustrated by the recent con-
flicts involving the inter-state railways. In spring and summer 2010, Uzbekistan permanently blocked railway 
deliveries to Tajikistan. As described above, the former country disputes the idea of its smaller neighbour build-
ing additional hydro power plants, fearing further disruptions to water supplies. As the principal railway connec-
tion to Tajikistan transits Uzbekistan, it provides a handy instrument of pressure. More than 1500 wagon cars 
have been blocked for months, including those with equipment for Sangtuda hydro power plant-2.  
Water supplies can also be used as a means of political and economic pressure. That happened, for instance, in 
May 2010, when Kazakhstan closed its border to Kyrgyzstan at the time of political upheaval in Bishkek. Kyr-
gyzstan promptly retaliated by interrupting water supplies for agricultural use to the Zhambul region of its north-
ern neighbour, which is heavily dependent on irrigated agriculture.  
Similar problems are observed in the area of cross-border electricity trade. Over recent decades, Russia and Ka-
zakhstan have efficiently managed extensive cross-border flows of electric power based on developed infrastruc-
ture and Kazakhstan’s comparative advantage as a provider of low-cost electric power produced from Ekibastuz 
coal. While Ekibastuz power was exported and consumed by neighbouring Russian regions just across the bor-
der, western parts of Kazakhstan were supplied with Russian energy. This situation was perceived as a threat by 
Kazakh authorities. It led to the construction of the 500km-long 500kW “North Kazakhstan – Aktobe region” 
power line, which cost around USD180 million to build in 2006-2007. Partly as a result of this, Kazakhstan’ s 
electric power imports from Russia fell from 5316 million kW/h in 2004 to 2214 million kW/h in 2008, while its 
exports to Russia remained virtually unchanged at 2379 million kW/h, despite the vast export potential of Eki-Subnational Resource Curse: Do Economic or Political Institutions Matter? 
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bastuz coal-fired power plants. This is four times lower than the levels achieved in the 1980s (VINOKUROV 
2008).   
Uzbekistan represents another striking example of the prevalence of the narrowly defined ‘electric power secu-
rity’ over an economically more beneficial regime of trans-boundary electricity flows within existing regional 
power systems. This country withdrew from the Unified Energy System of Central Asia (UES-CA) on December 
1st, 2009. This unilateral act was apparently in the planning for two years, while the Uzbek power system was 
being interconnected. Because of Uzbekistan’s central position, all Central Asian countries have been hit by this 
decision; Tajikistan, however, may be worst affected. For the last 70 years, Tajikistan has received a substantial 
proportion of its power supplies from neighbouring Uzbekistan (its energy deficit in the autumn-winter period 
constitutes around 2bn kW/h; this is covered by 0.6bn kW/h of Uzbek energy and 1.2bn kW/h of Turkmen en-
ergy transited through Uzbekistan). Over the same period, Tajikistan has exported comparable amounts of elec-
tricity to Southern Uzbekistan in the spring-summer season, in the process of irrigating countries located down-
stream on major rivers. One of the solutions now being actively considered is to connect Khudzhand (Tajiki-
stan), Datka (Kyrgyzstan) and Almaty (Kazakhstan) with a high-voltage power line, thus effectively bypassing 
Uzbekistan. This power line would, however, be longer than the existing one and require several years to build. 
Thus, Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the UES-CA has led to economically suboptimal production and the need 
for extensive capital investment. Uzbekistan will also be adversely hit by its own decision, as the country’s own 
power consumption peaks will no longer be covered by daily trans-border power flows within the regional uni-
fied system. In addition, effective international regulation of water in Central Asia has now become an even 
more remote prospect. 
However, border conflicts are not limited to water and energy. Central Asian states have taken measures to con-
trol this informal trade in border regions (e,g,, Uzbekistan’s campaign to “strengthen the border” in the Fergana 
Valley in 2008-2009, which included building a fully functional right-of-way, concrete walls and trenches; or the 
mine fields placed by Uzbekistan along the borders with Tajikistan – actually, on the Tajik territory). Even the 
most commonplace events – like a cow crossing the border between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in February 2010 
(NOVYI REGION, 2010) or Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz Republic one month earlier (RIA NOVOSTI, 2010) – can 
result in serious diplomatic conflicts with strong media influence. 
D.2. The role of China 
Economic interaction between China and Central Asian states has been growing on almost all levels over the 
past decades. First, China is one of the key foreign investors in the region, and has increased its activity over the 
recent decades. It is particularly true for the energy area, where the Chinese government looks at Central Asia as 
one of the key regions potentially diversifying the supply sources for the country: for instance, in Kazakhstan by 
2006 Chinese state-owned corporations (CNPC, SINOPEC and CITIC) already ranked second among the foreign 
investors in the oil and gas area (their assets include AktobeMunaiGaz; KarazhanbasMunai and PetroKazakh-
stan). From this point of view China is actively involved in a number of pipeline projects in the region, which at 
the moment are significantly less developed than those connecting Central Asia and Russia. However, while the 
Chinese share in oil and gas extraction in Kazakhstan is significant, the pipeline infrastructure is still mostly 
under construction – although the first pipelines connecting Kazakhstan and China (Atasu – Alashankou) and 
Turkmenistan and China are already operational. 
Second, China permanently builds on its foreign trade with Central Asia (as discussed below). Here, however, 
the story is somewhat different: while there seems to be conscious effort of the Chinese regional and central 
authorities to promote this trade, to a great extent the Chinese presence in Central Asia is based on the informal 
bazaar networks, which do, however, interact with state-owned companies. China primarily exports consumer 
goods  and  machines  and  equipment  to  Central  Asia.  RABALLAND  and  ANDRESY  (2007)  discuss  three 
sources of trade growth between Central Asia and China: commerce of traders from Zhejiang, petty border trade 
and the activities of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corp. a paramilitary para-governmental institu-
tion.  The  literature  reports  significant  efforts  by  the  Chinese  government  to  promote  this  small-scale  trade 
(SWANSTROEM 2003); so it looks like while on the one hand informal trade between China and Central Asia 
is growing due to the activity of non-governmental actors, these informal interrelations fit in quite well with the 
strategy of the Chinese government. One potential area of increasing ties between Central Asia and China is 
agriculture; in 2010 China was considering investing in soy-beans farming in Kazakhstan.  
In the area of migration, unlike the relations to Russia, China does not seem to play any significant role in Cen-
tral Asia; on the one hand, China does not seem to experience demand for labour (unlike Russia) and supports Is It Really Different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central 
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the movement of the Han migrants to Xinjiang, and, on the other hand, Central Asian states are highly sensitive 
to the issue of migration from China and prefer a very cautious attitude. 
D.3. The role of Russia 
Over the 1990s the economic role of Russia in Central Asia was gradually declining, partly because of the at-
tempts of Central Asian states to protect their domestic markets (which were evident e.g. after the crisis in 1998) 
and partly because of economic weakness of Russia itself. The situation changed during the 2000s with Russia 
once again turning into a crucial economic partner for Central Asia. This is related to three main aspects. First, 
Russia was able to enhance its interrelations with Central Asia in the energy sphere. From 2004, Russian compa-
nies (Gazprom, LUKoil, InterraoUES, Rosneft) were able to acquire substantial assets in Kazakhstan and partly 
Uzbekistan. While in the 1990s Kazakhstan remained particularly open to multinationals from developed coun-
tries, thus restricting the “window of opportunities” for the then-weak Russian business, in the 2000s Russian 
companies became stronger and Kazakhstan turned to a more hostile policy towards Western multinationals. 
Gazprom was able to sign contracts with almost all Central Asian countries regarding the purchase and the trans-
portation of their oil and gas for amounts large enough to prevent Central Asia from developing alternative 
routes of transportation (i.e. to China). In this case, the Russian success is not so straightforward: in the late 
2000s Russia even had to deal with the consolidated position of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan re-
garding the price increase for the oil and gas exported from the region. As oil and gas are a key area of political 
concern for the Russian government, any interaction in this field usually has a very strong element of power 
politics and does depend upon the strategic considerations of Central Asian states. 
Second, Russia has played a significant role in the non-oil and gas area. Mostly it can be associated with three 
sectors: metals and mining (where Russian investors have purchased significant assets in Kazakhstan and Kyr-
gyz Republic and attempted to expand to Tajikistan, where, however, the government restricted their access to 
the most attractive businesses); manufacturing (where Russian business basically uses the old links established 
by the Soviet production chains – in automotive and heavy machinery (KaMAZ, AvtoVAZ), agricultural ma-
chinery (Agromashkholding) and transportation equipment (Transmashkholding)) and “new” industries of food 
processing and particularly communications and mobile service provision, where new Russian companies (in 
most cases almost free from any forms of political pressure and control) expand in the countries with similar 
cultural and institutional environment. KHEYFETS (2009) reports a detailed list of the Russian FDI in Central 
Asia; in addition, many machine-building companies expand in Central Asia through long-term cooperation 
contracts with the local businesses. Whether this process is sufficient to compensate the centripetal forces of the 
Soviet collapse, is questionable – and the SIEI result suggest, it is not (most integration in this area is not infor-
mal and therefore at least in the area of trade captured by statistics). This area, however, seems to be almost 
independent from the “direct” political pressures. 
Finally, as the SIEI documents, there is a huge surge of migration from Central Asia to Russia, which for some 
countries (Tajikistan) turned the remittances into one of the main sources of revenue for the national economy. 
Here the migrants seem to benefit from strong demand of the growing Russian economy for the labour force and 
from still-existing cultural links (like knowledge of Russian or presence of ethnic networks in Russia itself). The 
link to the Russian political objectives is much weaker here: in many cases, because of the internal political 
concerns, which are likely to outweigh the foreign policy considerations (migration is among the main areas of 
public opinion focus in Russia, as in most emigration countries of the world), Russian government (and, even 
more important, local and regional authorities, which play an important role in this area) would rather prefer 
restricting the migration. However, bad quality of bureaucracy (unable to exercise any efficient labour market 
control) and demand for labour force from Russian businesses seems to keep the migration networks significant 
– most of them actually survived the crisis of 2008-2009. It is interesting to notice that regionalisation has been 
really successful in the FSU in the area where the “political motivation” of the Russian government has been the 
weakest, i.e. migration (compare the SIEI data), while in other areas with potentially stronger political motiva-
tion the success is weaker. 
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